THE ROBERTS CASE AS ILLUSTRATING A GREAT PREROGATIVE OF CONGRESS by TAYLOR, ROBERT W.
YALE
LAW JOURNAL
VOL. X. DECEMBER, 1900. No. 2
THE ROBERTS CASE AS ILLUSTRATING A GREAT
PREROGATIVE OF CONGRESS.
BY ROBERT W. TAYLOR, CHAIRMAN OF THE ELECTIONS COMMIT-
TEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
The Federal Constitution, Article 1, Section 2, provides
that, "No person shall be a representative who shall not have
attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years
a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected,
be an inhabitant of the State in which he shall be chosen."
At the regular election in November, 1898, Brigham H.
Roberts was chosen by the electors of the State of Utah their
representative in the Fifty-sixth Congress. He was twenty-five
years of age, had been seven years a citizen of the United States
and was, when elected, an inhabitant 'f the State of Utah.
The proper officers of the State duly certified t6 his election and
the certificate was filed with the clerk of the House of Repre-
sentatives.
At the opening of the first session of the Congress to which
he was elected, objection was made to his being sworn in on
the ground that he was a polygamist. After investigation and
full argument, the House, by an overwhelming vote, refused to
permit him to take his seat.
-The rightfulness of this exercise of power has been ques-
tioned and the grounds of the objection to it have been fullyset
out in the report of the minority of the committee appointed
to investigate the case and in the debate which followed on the
floor of the House.
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Judging from my own experience, and that of most of those
with whom I came in contact in the discussion of this question,
the first impression is against the right of the House to refuse
admission to a person, duly elected and possessing the qualifi-
cations which Roberts possessed. In my own case, reflection
and investigation led me to an opinion contrary to that which
I first entertained, and the same result occurred in the
minds of a large majority of members, who, at the outset,
thought as I did.
The action of the House has, in some quarters, been attrib-
uted to hysteria and emotion. Nothing could be farther from
the truth. The alternative method of admitting Roberts and
instantly thereafter expelling him satisfied every demand of
mere emotion and was indeed insisted upon by those who
planted themselves solely on the moral and sentimental side of
the question.
The limits of such a paper as this permit only brief discus-
sion. An argument fully covering the ground would involve an
exhaustive inquiry into the form and philosophy of government
and of our own government in particular. Indeed, while a con-
stitutional question, it is more aptly to be described as in-
stitutional. To have permitted Roberts to take his seat would
have been to deny the very right of government. While his ex-
clusion was in strict accord with the Constitution, yet the ac-
tion which the House took can be sustained on elemental prin-
ciples which it would be impossible to deny in a constitution.
The Constitution, Article 1, Section 5, provides that, "Each
House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifica-
tions of its own members."
Without, at this stage, discussing the question as to whether
either House of Congress, or both combined, can add to the
constitutional qualifications set out in the first paragraph of
this paper, or disqualify for any reason not implied therein, a
moment's reflection con vinces one that Congress, as a law-mak-
ing body, cannot pass a law adding a new qualification or
creating a disqualification for membership in either House
which will be binding on any subsequent House.
To admit that such a power exists is to say that a Congress
today can declare how the next Congress shall be constituted.
As our national legislative body is created by theConstitution,
it cannot have a single power taken from it or a single limita-
tion put upon it by any other body. Nevertheless, it is true
that Congress has, from time to time, passed laws imposing
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new qualifications or declaring disqualifications applicable in
terms to succeeding Congresses; but they were permitted to be
so considered only in an advisory or suggestive sense and not
compulsorily.
The question in the Roberts case was substantially this:
Are the provisions of Article 1, Section 2, declaring that no per-
son shall be aRepresentativein Congress unless he possesses cer-
tain named qualifications, exclusive? That is to say,do they deny
to either House of Congress the right to add new qualifications
for membership or to create disqualifications. A distinction is
to be drawn between the adddition of a new qualification and
the creation of a disqualification arising out of the voluntary
act of the individual who places himself, by the commission of
an offense, against the law or civilization, within the disquali-
fied class. As for instance, for the House to say that it will not
admit a member-elect because he cannot read and write is to be
sharply differentiated from the refusal of the House to admit a
murderer, a lunatic, or a traitor. I do not know that any
commentator or any court or either house of Congress has ever
questioned the propriety of that distinction, and it has, so far
as I have been able to find, been persistently recognized when-
ever the question was clearly raised.
It is not my purpose to pursue more than one phase of this
great question. The argument in favor of the exclusion of Rob-
erts, in so far as it is not covered by what I shall hereafter say,
is briefly summarized as follows:
1. The language of the constitutional provision, the his-
tory of its framing in the constitutional convention, and its
context clearly show that it cannot be construed to prevent
disqualification for crime.
2. The overwhelming authority of text-book writers on the
Constitution is to the effect that such disqualification may be
imposed by the House, and no commentator of the Constitu-
tion specifically denies it.
3. The courts of several of the States in construing anal-
ogous provisions, have with practical unanimity declared
against such narrow construction of such constitutional pro-
visions.
4. The House of Representatives has never denied that it
had the right to exclude a member-elect, even when he had the
three constitutional requirements.
5. In many instances it has distinctly asserted its right so
to do in cases of disloyalty and crime.
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6. It passed in 1862 the test-oath act, which imposed a
real and substantial disqualification for membership in Con-
gress, disqualifying.hundreds of thousands of American citizens.
This law remained in force and was obeyed for twenty years.
7. The House in 1869 adopted a general rule of order,
which continued operative for some years, providing that no
person should be sworn in as a member against whom the ob-
jection was made that he was not entitled to take the test oath;
if upon investigation such fact appeared, he was to be perma -
nently debarred from entrance.
It is not contended that either the dictum of the commen-
tators, the judgment of a court, or a legislative precedent es-
tablishes the law or is conclusive upon Congress in a question
involving the right of a member to his seat; yet they are per-
suasive, and when agreeing as uniformly as we find them in
this relation, they are absolutely convincing.
Nevertheless, it will profit us to examine the whole question
on elemental principles.
The Federal Congress is the highest legislative body known
to our laws. It was created by the Constitution and must, of
course, possess all the rights and powers which the Consti-
tution gives it and all those inherent and elementary powers
necessary to its own life which the Constitution does not dis-
tinctly deny to it, and as Judge Cooley remarks,"The Constitu-
tion must be construed in the light of the common law."
Roberts was charged with, and before the committee ap-
pointed to investigate his case, was conclusively proven guilty
of, being an open, flagrant, and defiant polygamist, claiming
that the Acts of Congress in that respect were not
binding upon him.
The institution of polygamy has been denounced by both
Congress and the Suprenfe Court. In Congress by the most
solemn and well:considered enactments; by the Supreme Court
in many profound and thoughtful decisions. The student of
legislative enactment and of the highest judicial consideration
of it, will find a rich mine of information and instruction if he
examines the few laws which Congress has passed respecting
polygamy, and carefully reads what our Supreme Court says of
them. As the initiative of these laws was with the body of the
people, they aroused the interest and enlisted the activity of
the ablest and most acute statesmen of the last thirty years;
and our highest court has given them the most philosophic
consideration.
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Many years ago, Congress began to legislate on the subject
and in 1882 it enacted what is known as the Edmunds law; a
really effective law harmonizing, at once, with the demand of
civilization and the spirit of judicial construction. By that Act
polygamy was clearly defined and provision made for its severe
punishment. Its incidental relations were also defined and suit-
able punishment provided for.
In passing on an earlier Act providing a punishment for
polygamy, Chief Justice Waite, in the course of an elaborate
opinion setting forth the views of a united court, said:
"Polygamy has always been odious among the northern
and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of
the Mormon church, was almost exclusively a feature of Asiatic
and of African people.
"Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation,
is nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and
usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be said to be
built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social
obligations and duties, -with which government is necessarily
required to deal. In fact, according as monogamous or polyga-
mous marriages are allowed, do we find the principles on
which the government of the people to a greater or less ex-
tent rests.
"Can a man excuse his practices to the country because
of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of
the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a
law unto himself. Government could exist only in name un-
der such circumstances."
In construing the Edmunds Act, Justice Matthews, voicing
the unanimous opinion of the court, says:
"Certainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome
and necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing common-
wealth, fit to take rank as one of the co-ordinate States of the
Union, than that which seeks to establish it on the basis of the
idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from the union
for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of matri-
mony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in
our civilization, the best guaranty of that reverent morality
which is the source of all benificent progress in social and polit-
ical improvement."
The spirit of these two excerpts is apparent in all the opin-
ions delivered by the Supreme Court in cases arising out of
polygamy.
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Several of our Presidents have deemed the subject of such
importance as to make reference to it in their annual messages
and to congratulate the people upon the apparent eradication
of polygamy.
We thus discover every branch of the Federal government,
in the most solemn language, laying down the proposition that
monogamy is the corner-stone of our civilization; that our
government grows out of and is dependent upon that civiliza-
tion, and that polygamy wars against it.
After the passage oftheselaws, after these solemnjudicial dec-
larations, after the executive proclamation justly characterizing
those who practiced polygamy, Brigham H. Roberts contracted
two polygamous marriages, making three matrimonial ven-
tures in progress at the same time. He did not do so with the
idea that the Supreme Court would declare unconstitutional
the Edmunds Act which he was violating. That court had sev-
eral times sustained it, and never after Brigham Roberts' first
unlawful marriage was it even called upon to pass upon its
constitutionality. It was universally recognized as valid. He
continued and persisted in maintaining his polygamous relations
up to the time of his election to Congress. He was not one of
those who had contracted a plural marriage before the courts
had settled the propriety of congressional enactments denounc-
ingthem. He was absolutely without excuse,except that he did
not recognize the validity of any law of Congress or any judg-
ment of the Supreme Court so long as they interfered with his
views on the subject of plural marriages. He frequently declared
himself above the law and not bound by it, and he illustrated
this declaration and his contempt for Congress and the Courts
by contracting two plural marriages. We look in vain through
all our history for another such defiant, persistent, audacious
violator of a solemnly enacted law which had in it the elements
both of good morals and of civilization, and hence the vital
elements of government.
Now in a popular government, practically administered, a
man's opinions are of little moment, and no attention would
have been paid to Roberts' opinion if he had not expressed him-
self in acts which were openly and defiantly violative of the
law; violative of laws passed by the very body which he
sought to enter.
As before indicated, the whole argument in favor of the ad-
mission of Roberts was based upon the assertion of a technical
rule of law, to wit: "The expression of one thing is the ex-
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clusion of another" and that the sum and substance of con-
gresssional power, in this respect, was bound up in the prop-
osition that any person elected to Congress must be admitted
if he possessed the necessary qualifications-age, citizenship,
and inhabitancy. That is to say, according to the contention
of those who maintained the other side of this question, Article
1, Section 2, in its present form, meant precisely the same as if
it read, "Every person who is of the age of twenty-five years,
etc., shall, if elected, be permitted to take his seat in Congress."
If the makers of the Constitution had meant any such thing
they could have phrased it in fewer and happier words than are
used in the Constitution as it now stands.
Let us see what conclusion we can arrive at from implica-
tion-and it is only by the rule of necessary implication that
Roberts' admission could be justified.
Elsewhere, the Constitution says, "This Constitution and
the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land." If Congress
was without rightful power to exclude Roberts, then, for the
purpose of his case, we must read into the Constitution, other
words which are now said to be implied, so that the provision I
have just called for would read as follows:
"This Constitution and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of
the land, provided, that no person shall be ineligible to a seat
as Representative who, in form and substance, in word and
act, in life and practice defies this Constitution and the laws
made in pursuance thereof, and denies their validity and
supremacy."
If the Federal Constitution had made such a declaration
which, it is now declared, must be implied, that Constitution
and the government which it sought to create could not have
endured for a single day.
Judge Shaw says in Hiss v. Bartlett (3 Gray 473), "It is
necessary to put extreme cases to test a principle."
Let me put one or two extreme, but entirely fair and proper
cases, with which to test this principle. Suppose that Brigham
H. Roberts, instead of being charged with polygamy, had been
charged with actual treason, which was proven to the satis-
faction of Congress by a credible witness whose testimony was
undisputed, and Roberts himself had admitted that he had
waged war against the United States, had given aid and com-
fort to Spain, actively, not constructively, and had appeared
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btfore the House and said: "I did wage war against the United
States; I did give aid and comfort to its enemies in time of war
against a foreign foe, and I gloryin it."
In that state of facts the law could not lay its hand upon
him for the crime of treason because the Constitution declares
that no person shall be convicted of treason except upon the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or by confes-
sion in open court. Suppose that he, in that status, appeared
before the House with a certificate of election from a sovereign
State and demanded admission. Would he be admitted? Not
if the Honse had any conception of government andthe dignity
and duty of a legislative body.
Another illustration. Suppose that on the first day ofJan-
uary, 1899, two months after his election and two months be-
fore his term as Representative commenced, hehad been charged
with the crime of counterfeiting and was tried, convicted, and
sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of two years; suppose
that it so occurred that his term of imprisonment would expire
on the third day of March, 1901, the day before his term as
Representative in Congress expired. Assuming that he pre-
sented himself on that day, would the House have to admit
him or would it not, long before that, have declared his seat
vacant? It would have no right to declare his seat vacant
merely because he was absent, for that was voluntary, and
therefore not to be construed as a resignation of the seat. If
we are to follow the lead of those who contend that Roberts
ought to have been sworn in, it would have been our duty, in
the illustration just given, when he presented himself to be
sworn in, to beg him with tender persuasiveness to honor the
House by being sworn in so that it might have the felicity im-
mediately thereafter of turning him out.
The duty of the House in such a case becomes apparent
when the case is stated. Its own dignity, its own constitu-
tional power to pass upon the qualifications of its members
would demand that it hold the claimant at the threshold, in-
quire into the case,and, not to mention other conditions justify-
ing exclusion, close the door upon that member who is an open,
notorious violator of the solemn enactments of the body
which he seeks to enter.
The fear that the action of the House creates a dangerous
precedent is groundless. It exercised no power which amajority
may not always exercise. Roberts was permitted to vote on
the organization of the House. This was done because he held
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a certificate of election and in the formative process of a legis-
lative bodythere must be gathered together enough individuals
with a colorable right of participation, in order that form may
come out of chaos and the breath of life be breathed into what
otherwise would be a mere mob. For such purpose of organi-
zation, it was a matter of no consequence whether the member-
elect was sworn in or not. The first duty of those elected was
to organize and for that purpose all are deemed of equal right.
The Roberts case settled, for all time I think, the right of
the House to protect itself. For the wise useof that right it can
be held responsible only before the bar of public opinion and
by the several constituencies which create it.
